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People who by training end up dealing with proba-
bilities (“statisticians”) roughly fall into one of two
camps. One is either a frequentist or a Bayesian. To
a scientist, who needs to use probabilities to make
sense of the real world, this division seems some-
times baffling. I will argue that science mostly deals
with Bayesian questions. Yet the dominance of fre-
quentist ideas in statistics points many scientists in
the wrong statistical direction.
Frequentists define probability as the long-run
frequency of a certain measurement or observation.
The frequentist says that there is a single truth and
our measurement samples noisy instances of this
truth. The more data we collect, the better we can
pinpoint the truth. The archetypal example is the re-
peated tossing of a coin to see what the long-run fre-
quency is of heads or tails; this long-run frequency
then asymptotes to the truth.
Bayesians define probability as the plausibil-
ity of a hypothesis given incomplete knowledge.
This is in fact the original definition of probabil-
ity.1 To a Bayesian there is no Platonic truth out
there which we want to access through data collec-
tion (or perhaps we should say there may be a Pla-
tonic truth, but it will always remain outside our ex-
perience). For a Bayesian, there is just data which
we can use as evidence for particular hypotheses. A
Bayesian coin-tosser just observes a series of coin
tosses and then uses this information to make de-
ductions about, for example, how likely it is that the
coin is fair.
The coin-tossing example is in fact quite sub-
tle. It may be argued that the frequentist view of
the experiment appears fine in some Platonic sense
but is flawed in practice. We need to ask ourselves
whether there is a “true” fraction to which the fre-
quency in the coin-tossing experiment for a fair coin
should asymptote. We have a specific, but idealised
view of what the repeated experiment should en-
tail. We would probably argue that all coin-tosses
happen under the same circumstances, but in such a
way that the outcome is essentially maximally ran-
dom. There is a contradiction here: the coin-tosses
are the same insofar that each experiment must have
the same validity and samples the same set of pos-
sible outcomes in the same way. But equally, the
coin-tosses have to be different in some sense, oth-
erwise the outcomes would be the same.
What is an acceptable coin-toss in reality? We
can agree it is not just dropping a coin from two
inches high. We would need to give it a good spin
and drop the coin from a good height. But we can-
not move away from the fact that the experiment is
ultimately deterministic. So, at least in principle,
the outcome of the coin-toss is fully determined by
the initial condition.
So we see that the long-run frequency for a real
coin-tossing experiment is as much a function of the
way the experiment is performed as it is a property
of the coin. If we define the initial conditions pre-
cisely then the outcome of the coin-toss can be cal-
culated precisely (at least, in principle). So appar-
ently we need to allow for some variability, some
uncertainty in the experimental set-up.
This is the frequentist trap: if we get an asymp-
totic frequency of 1⁄2 for heads to come up, is this ev-
idence that we have done a truly randomized (what-
ever that may mean) experiment to discover that the
coin was fair, or is it evidence that we have done a
biased experiment with an unfair coin? We cannot
distinguish these by a frequentist experiment, be-
cause to distinguish between the two cases we need
to know precisely how the experiment was done.
But this in a way precludes the frequentist notion
of a repeated experiment.
Instead, the real-world coin-toss experiment
lives in the Bayesian domain: the experiment is
done under limited knowledge of the initial condi-
tions and precise set-up. Given that limited knowl-
edge, how do we use the experimental outcomes to
evaluate a statement such as “the coin is fair”? This
is a Bayesian question. Bayesian statistics is the
statistics of the real world, not of its Platonic ideal.
Let us look at an analysis of a particular experi-
ment where 20 coin-tosses were performed and we
got 12 heads and 8 tails (we shall ignore the order in
which the heads and tails came up). What next? We
shall first take a frequentist view on this and then a
Bayesian view.
The frequentist sees the particular outcome as
an instance of an infinity of possible outcomes,
given a particular truth. Suppose we start by think-
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ing that the coin is fair (that is, in our idealized
experiment we expect the long-run frequency to
asymptote to 1⁄2). The frequentist would then cal-
culate probabilities of the particular outcome, given
the truth. For example, what is the probability of
12 heads and 8 tails if the coin is fair? It turns out
to be a quite respectable 12%. The chance of get-
ting 11, 10, or 9 heads (that is, closer to the “truth”)
turns out to be 50%. So we have done worse than
being within one coin-toss away from the truth, but
the chance of doing so is 50% as well. This be-
comes more pertinent if we find values that are fur-
ther away from the expected truth. For example,
suppose we get 13 heads and 7 tails. Then there is
about a 74% chance of getting closer to the truth
than this if the coin was fair.
Should we now start to suspect the coin? This
question is impossible to answer without moving
to the Bayesian domain. The chance of getting 13
heads and 7 tails with a fair coin is about 7.4%. But
suppose the coin (or the experiment —there is no
way to distinguish here) was biased and the true
long-run frequency for heads was 13⁄20 instead of 1⁄2.
In this case the chance of getting 13 heads and 7
tails is about 18.4%, a factor of 2.5 higher compared
to the fair coin. But even though our experimen-
tal evidence is more consistent with a biased coin,
we probably would still not think that our coin is
likely to be biased; we would probably think that
the coin was fair and that this experiment just came
out this way by chance. But to come to such a con-
clusion we actually have to include some prior idea
that it is more likely that the coin is fair. In other
words, to assess the question of the fairness of the
coin, in light of the frequentist evidence that we got
13 heads and 7 tails, we need to have access to the
non-frequentist prior information about how likely
we think it is that the coin was fair to start with.
A Bayesian sees one particular experiment and
uses this to test some hypothesis. So we can ask
the question “what is the probability that the coin is
fair, given that I got 13 heads and 7 tails?” Using
Bayes’ theorem this is written as a combination of
conditional probabilities:
p(fair|13h7t) = p(13h7t|fair) p(fair)
p(13h7t)
.
We see that the familiar probability p(13h7t|fair) of
getting 13 heads and 7 tails assuming the coin is
fair (which is 7.4% —see above) needs to be com-
bined with prior probabilities on whether we think
the coin is fair to start with, p(fair), and the prior
probability of getting the outcome of 13 heads and
7 tails, p(13h7t), irrespective of any knowledge of
the fairness of the coin. This last probability is hard
to assess, but it could in principle be calculated by
summing over all possible complementary truths i
(with “fair” being just one of those possibilities):
p(13h7t) = ∑
i
p(13h7t|i) p(i).
We can view it as the normalization of p(fair|13h7t)
over all possible truths. Either way, it is not neces-
sarily easy to get good values for these prior prob-
abilities. In this sense, the Bayesian viewpoint ap-
pears to add difficulty for not much gain. However,
it does make explicit what prior knowledge is re-
quired before an assessment of the probability of the
truth of a hypothesis can be calculated.
Although the example above is somewhat
starkly observed, it should make clear that the fre-
quentist viewpoint cannot tell much useful about
the hypothesis of whether a coin is fair. It should
be emphasized that a frequentist would, or should
not claim to give such evidence. The frequentist
gives a probability of an event given a truth (the
p(13h7t|fair), above) and tries to use this informa-
tion for any statements.
Such frequentist statements are the basis for
significance testing. These statements cannot say
much useful about the validity of the underlying hy-
pothesis, even less, anything quantitative. Indeed
significance tests formally do not aim to do so, al-
though the terminology of significance tests is no-
toriously misleading and obfuscating —for exam-
ple, a “significant” difference between two mea-
surements means something very specific, but, con-
trary to what the phrase implies (and, unfortunately,
contrary to how significance tests are mostly used
in practice), it does not mean that the difference has
a high probability of being significant.2
A frequentist can calculate probabilities pre-
cisely, but often not the probabilities we want. A
Bayesian can calculate the probabilities we want,
but often cannot do it precisely.
The above characterisation is rather crude, and
can be criticised in all kinds of ways, but it does
give the flavour of the key practical difference be-
tween the viewpoints. There are clearly more pre-
cise differences, most importantly in what “proba-
bility” actually means. But to argue about the dif-
ferent merits of the two viewpoints can easily de-
scent into sophistry. (Clearly, this essay itself is in
some danger to be an exercise in sophistry.)
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In practice we end up mixing the two view-
points and we should choose the most appropriate
one. But given the historical dominance of frequen-
tism in teaching statistics, it is worth advocating that
Bayesian statistics is in many ways a more funda-
mental, and more useful view of statistics.
Firstly, we need to dispel the myth that a
Bayesian probability, the plausibility of a hypothe-
sis given incomplete knowledge, is in some sense
a more vague concept than a frequentist proba-
bility, which is based on counting possible out-
comes. It has been rigorously shown, most notably
by Richard Cox3, that there is nothing inexact about
Bayesian probabilities: they must satisfy precisely
the same algebraic rules as frequentist probabilities.
In other words, Bayesian probability has as power-
ful an axiomatic framework as frequentist probabil-
ity, and many would argue it has a more powerful
framework.
Another myth to dispel is that Bayesian statis-
tics is too advanced for basic statistics teaching.
Your mileage may vary, but I can honestly state
that when I first came across probabilities in math-
ematics class, I needed to change my essentially
Bayesian idea of probability into a frequentist one.
After all, in daily usage, statements of probabil-
ity are overwhelmingly Bayesian, and not frequen-
tist: “How likely is it I will get wet on my way
to school?” —an example of an everyday, per-
fectly sensible question about probabilities which is
nearly impossible to interpret sensibly in a frequen-
tist framework.
This begs the question of how we approach
traditional frequentist teaching examples within a
Bayesian framework. For example, we have a bag
with 10 red and 20 blue marbles and draw one mar-
ble out of the bag. What is the probability of draw-
ing a red marble? In traditional teaching we have
approached this kind of question through a frequen-
tist framework: we imagine we can repeat this ex-
periment as often as we like; it is then clear that we
can draw any of the marbles, irrespective of colour,
and so in 1⁄3 of the cases we would draw a red mar-
ble. So the long-run frequency of drawing a red
marble would be 1⁄3 and this then is our desired prob-
ability.
The Bayesian view invites much more interest-
ing questions about related set-ups (“I just drew a
red marble; what is the probability that the majority
of marbles is red?”) but in the present boring set-up
the Bayesian viewpoint is essentially the same as
the frequentist one but more directly related to the
real-world experiment: I am going to draw a single
marble; in the Bayesian viewpoint it is then a per-
fectly sensible question to ask what the probability
is that in that single particular draw I get a red mar-
ble. The answer is clearly the same: one in three
marbles is red and so this probability is 1⁄3. The
Bayesian interpretation of probability of a single
event is completely natural: given my knowledge
of the experimental set-up (there are 10 red marbles
and 20 blue marbles in this bag), what is the proba-
bility that we get a particular outcome. The frequen-
tist apparently needs to add the thought experiment
of repeating the experiment an infinite number of
times. So I ask you: which viewpoint more easily
applies to this textbook example?
In all honesty, I cannot think of a single exam-
ple in science where a frequentist viewpoint is more
natural than a Bayesian viewpoint, although I am
keen to hear of such examples, as they perhaps do
exist. Think of the repeated measurement of some
variable; to make things specific, think of measur-
ing the period of a pendulum with a stopwatch. The
frequentist would argue that repeated measurements
of this period would represent a sample from some
true distribution of possible outcomes of this mea-
surement. Our repeated measurements can then be
used to make statements about this underlying dis-
tribution. A typical statement would be that the best
estimate of the mean of this underlying distribution
is the average of the measured periods.4
The Bayesian approach to the same experiment
to my mind is more natural. We have this set of
measurements of the period. With this informa-
tion we can assess the probabilities of all kinds of
statements. For example, what is now the proba-
bility that if I make another measurement the pe-
riod of this pendulum is between such and such a
value? Bayes’ equation again gives the practical
way of approaching this (and at the same time re-
minds us that there are all kinds of prior assump-
tions going into this experiment), but more funda-
mentally it does not require us to assume the pres-
ence of some “true” underlying distribution from
which we are sampling. The pendulum will be sub-
ject to all kinds of unknown environmental factors
and we know little about the underlying distribution
(although the central limit theorem may help us in
some cases). Instead, we measure some values with
some spread, and we can use Bayes’ theorem for
example to decide on the most likely distribution of
periods given what we know about the experiment.
In fact, if we only know these measured values, and
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nothing else, then the most likely distribution is a
Gaussian with the measured mean and spread. This
is a result from making certain assumptions on prior
distributions, for example following a maximum en-
tropy argument; whatever one’s views about these
techniques, they do amplify the fact that most inter-
esting, real-world probabilistic statements rely on
prior assumptions. In a frequentist approach these
assumptions are mostly implicit and sometimes hid-
den; in Bayesian statistics these prior assumptions
are made explicit. The fact that we do not resort
to some Platonic ideal outcome from fictional re-
peated experiments, but deal with the world as it is
presented to us, warts and all, to me gives Bayesian
statistics the edge.
Up to this point I have deliberately discussed ex-
amples which would at first sight perhaps be most
naturally viewed as frequentist problems. However
it was found that a Bayesian point of view is at
least as natural a way of considering these exam-
ples. Moreover, real science presents us often with
questions that are of a probabilistic nature, but def-
initely not of a frequentist nature. “How likely is
it that climate change is man-made?” There is no
sensible way in which this can be viewed as a fre-
quentist problem. There are also questions that at
first sight do not appear to be of a probabilistic na-
ture but in practice they still are. “Does medicine A
work better than medicine B?” This question seems
to be of a deterministic rather than a probabilistic
character. However, given that a real-world medical
trial would normally present us with evidence that
is not 100% conclusive, any statements made about
the relative efficacy of the two medicines will be a
probabilistic statement. In fact, most of science ap-
pears to be like that.5 Science is not like mathemat-
ics; there are no absolute truths or falsehoods. We
just gather evidence that supports certain models of
reality.
To end with a Bayesian statement: The
Bayesian viewpoint is very likely the most relevant
probabilistic framework for science.
1See, for example, J. M. Keynes, A treatise on probability. Macmillan, London (1921); E. T. Jaynes, Probability
theory. The logic of science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2003).
2There is a long history of people pointing out the terrible misuse and misinterpretation of significance tests in
all areas of science. In atmospheric science: N. Nicholls, 2001: The insignificance of significance testing. Bull.
Amer. Meteor. Soc., 82, 981–986; M. H. P. Ambaum, 2010: Significance tests in climate science. J. Climate, 23,
5927–5932. In psychology: J. Cohen, 1994: The Earth is round (p < 0.05). Amer. Psychol., 49, 997–1003; J. E.
Hunter, 1997: Needed: A ban on the significance test. Psychol. Sci., 8, 3–7. In economics: S. T. Ziliak and D. N.
McCloskey, The Cult of Statistical Significance. University of Michigan Press (2008). The list goes on.
3See, for example, R. T. Cox: The algebra of probable inference. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore (1961).
4I do open a can of worms here: if I recorded the frequency instead and would take the average frequency to be
the best estimate of the frequency of the pendulum, this would correspond to a different outcome than if I took the
average of the periods, and then took the inverse. To solve this terrible conundrum, we need to know which of these
two variables are more closely described by a simple symmetric distribution, something that is highly dependent on
the precise experimental set-up, and also very hard to assess with a limited set of measurements. Thankfully, if the
spread is small enough this makes not much difference.
In more complicated fields of science, this is not an easy issue to address and is often simply ignored. For exam-
ple, many people happily talk about the average daily rainfall without asking what this average actually represents.
Daily rainfall has a highly skewed distribution, and the average of a set of samples is non-trivially related to the
shape of this distribution. Average daily rainfall does not measure the most likely rainfall value you might get on
any one day —you mostly get rainfall days with very little rain and every so often days with (much) more rain. In
fact, even if correctly interpreted as the scale variable in the appropriate rainfall distribution, a simple average daily
rainfall is not the right estimate of this scale. Let us keep the can of worms closed for now.
5This is clearly only a very partial picture of science. Think of Newton’s laws of gravity. In some sense we are
certain they are incorrect: Einsteins theory of gravity is a better model of gravity. Such a situation is not obviously
described in probabilistic terms, frequentist or Bayesian, except in a trivial way. In physics we are usually quite
certain that all our models are wrong at some level of scrutiny but are right at another level. The standard model of
particle physics is very likely wrong, or at least incomplete, yet it has up to now survived all experimental scrutiny.
I think physics is in this sense special: there appear to be grand narratives, theories that work in one situation and
not in another. However, statements in physics about individual experiments become probabilistic again; think of
the recent discovery (or not) of the Higgs boson.
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